Security assumptions
An open investigation, a closed wallet release gate and a precise account of the evidence.
Wallet tester release NOT CLEARED
01MetaMask investigation
A user reported “Continue at your own risk” during connection or network switching. Exact extension version, full wording, request origin/type and provider details have not been independently captured. Domain phishing, network trust, address reputation and transaction alerts are not interchangeable classifications. Root cause remains unknown.
The production hostname is vektra-inky.vercel.app. A pinned public MetaMask list at commit be9cb98e307ad3bdc01fc37d4484132ea300800d contained no exact/ancestor match and no entry containing vektra. The official @metamask/phishing-controller 18.2.1 detector also returned result: false (type: all) against that snapshot, including fuzzy matching. This does not clear live provider classifications or interaction warnings.
No domain migration, disabled wallet protection or warning bypass was used. No false-positive report has been submitted because the responsible classification is unestablished. A factual triage report records evidence and unknowns without calling the site cleared.
02Release gate and recovery
lib/security-policy.ts sets walletActionsEnabled to false. Connector registration, EIP-6963 discovery and automatic reconnect are disabled. Account balance/preparation and send paths are blocked. The interface displays a notice and disabled action; the final broadcast path independently asserts policy.
Read-only quotes and docs remain available. Reopening requires identifying the warning/request, fixing confirmed issues, checking the responsible provider and verifying that flow without the warning. A deployment, lookup or submitted report is insufficient.
03Integration audit findings
The configured path uses injected Wagmi/Viem integration. Network switching is explicit. No application signMessage, signTypedData, personal_sign or eth_sign calls were found. Initial connection does not call token approval or submit a swap. No active WalletConnect/Reown integration exists.
Chain 4663 and the Robinhood RPC are configured. Local payloads bind canonical router and spender. Native ETH is value, never an ERC-20 approval. New grants use exact input. Responses cannot directly supply arbitrary transaction calldata.
Production checks observed HTTPS, HSTS and nosniff, with no external script src in homepage HTML. A Content-Security-Policy header was absent. These observations are not a penetration test or proof of an uncompromised origin.
Dependency scanning found transitive wallet SDK advisories. Presence is a maintenance finding, not evidence of the MetaMask warning cause. Unresolved advisories and wallet validation remain release concerns. No independent smart-contract audit is claimed.
04Assumptions and residual risks
Configured contracts, chain and RPC must behave as expected; wallet and browser must be uncompromised. Code presence and metadata cannot prove source provenance, audit coverage or immunity to protocol risks.
Bounds and simulation cannot guarantee profit, inclusion, fairness, MEV resistance or future contract behavior. RPC failures block preparation. A compromised UI origin or malicious extension is outside the protections provided by deterministic checks.
No seeds, keys or passwords are needed for this investigation. Read-only verification never needs a live swap or spending funds.
05Official review procedure
MetaMask distinguishes deceptive-site warnings from other security alerts. Domain removal is appropriate only after a domain classification is established and legitimate operation demonstrated. Request-level warnings require the actual request details and responsible provider review.
Use official resources below and leave wallet protections enabled. The application remains NOT CLEARED for wallet testers until the relevant real-wallet flow is verified without the warning.